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CHAPTER ONE 
A NATION ANNOUNCING ITSELF 
I nauguration Day, March 4, 1865, dawned over the city ofWashington with a blus-tery, overcast chill. It rained early in the morning, cleared, then rained again. But even without the copperation of the weather,.thousands upon thousands-~a 
crowd almost numberless,"wrote a visitor-braved the drizzle and cold to watch a 
giant parade, with now sodden floats, wheel up Pennsylvania Avenue toward the 
newly completed dome of the Capitol building. There, in the Capitol, the principal 
actor in this inauguration pageant, Abraham Lincoln, the president of the United 
States, was already at work, signing the last pieces oflegislation passed by the outgo-
ing Congress and witnessing a new Senate being sworn into office. 
The ceremonies held few surprises for Lincoln, since this day would mark Lin-
coln's second presidential inauguration. He had come to the Capitol on March 4, 
1861, as a newly elected president, untried and unprepared, and now, four years later, 
the country had chosen him a second time as its chief executive. When the congres-
sional ceremonies within the Capitol were over, a great file of legislators, cabinet 
secretaries, ambassadors, and judges streamed outeonto the Capitol steps, where a 
broad platform had been constructed for the president to take his oath of office in 
public view. Last of all onto the platform came Lincoln, holding in his hand a single 
large sheet of paper. A band struck up "Hail to the Chief" as "cheer upon cheer 
arose."1 
1. Ronald C. White, Lincoln's Greatest Speech: 1he Second InaugtJTal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 
Jo-:JI, 33; Noah Brooks, "Inauguration Day," in Lincoln Observed: Civil War Dispatches of Noah Brooks, ed. 
Michael Burlingame (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), r6168. 
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Four years before, when he first stood on a platform like this to take his presiden-
tial oath, the weather had still been thick with early spring chilliness and damp, but 
the sun shone with a hard and resolute cheerfulness. And in 1861 the sunshine was 
almost the only thing smiling upon Abraham Lincoln. Even as he took his first oath 
of office, swearing to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United 
States," seven of those supposedly united states had renounced their attachment 
to the Constitution. They had already organized a rival government, elected a rival 
president, and demanded that any of the property of the United States government 
sitting at that moment within their boundaries be turned over to them at once. Lin-
coln refused, and in short order it all came to war, the rebel states insisting that they 
were now an independent country with ·a right to determine their own future, and 
Lincoln insisting that they were only insurgents who had to be suppressed like any 
other treasonous coup d'etat. It was war such as few Americans had ever imagined: 
four years of it, with horrendous costs in life and property, and the ghoulish echo 
of homespun place-names made hideous in blood-Gettysburg, Chancellorsville, 
Shiloh. 
And now the spring of 1865 was coming. Lincoln's armies had finally turned the 
tide and the war was stumbling toward what looked like the end. In November the 
country had given Lincoln its vote of confidence by electing him to a second term as 
president. Now, on this raw March afternoon, as he stepped up to the low dais where 
he would deliver his inaugural address and take his second oath of office, he was 
ready to begin asking why the great horror of civil war had spread across his country. 
At that moment, the clouds parted and the long-hidden sun shone a golden aura 
down on Lincoln, the Capitol, and the hushed citizens below him. 
There were, Lincoln said, three fundamental causes that had pushed the United 
States into the war. One of them was political, and that was the fact that the United 
States had been organized since its birth as a union. It was the creation of thirteen 
former English colonies, huddled along the eastern seaboard of North America, 
that had declared themselves independent states in 1776 but also linked themselves 
together under a joint congress as a confederation. Ever since, there had been voices 
within those states arguing irritably that this Union was a bad bargain that ought 
to be terminated. The voices had come to a crescendo in the Southern states of the 
Union in 1861, and Lincoln had found himself as president "devoted altogether to 
saving the Union .without war" while at the same time having to deal with people 
who thought .it right and proper "to destroy it without war-seeking to dissolve the 
Union, and divide effects, by negotiation." 2 
But simply bi!cause the Southern states thought the Union should be dissolved 
did not necessarily mean that it had to be, ought to be, or even could be, and 
that led Lincoln to the next fundamental reason for civil war. "One eighth of the 
2. Abraham Lincoln, "Second Inaugural Address," in Collected l#,rk.r of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy F. Basler 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, r953), 8:332--JJ· 
A NATION ANNOUNCING ITSElf 5 
whole population were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, 
but localized in the Southern part of it." Protecting slavery, Lincoln declared, 
had become the chief irritant that provoked the Southern states to reach for the 
solution of disunion. "These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest," 
one that Lincoln and the northern states of the Union had declared a moral 
abomination that needed to be contained and suffocated. Though the Southern 
states hotly denied that they wanted to withdraw from the Union merely for the 
pleasure of enslaving people, Lincoln insisted that "all knew that this interest was, 
somehow, the cause of the war." Waving aside all the other supposed reasons for 
secession and war, Lincoln insisted that "to strengthen, perpetuate, and extend 
this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union, even 
by war." 
Even that much did not explain matters fully. Lincoln had come into office in 
r86r swearing to uphold the Constitution, which gave a number of vague guarantees 
to slaveholding in the fifteen Southern states where it was legal, and which gave 
presidents no power to meddle in state affairs such as slavery. In his first inaugural 
address, he had taken pains to acknowledge that, as president, he had no "right" and 
no "inclination" to attack slavery in those states. But across the Mississippi River, 
out over the broad prairies of the western half of the North American continent, 
were the immense miles ofU.S.-owned territory that had not yet been peopled and 
organized by white Americans, and which one day would want to be recognized 
and admitted to the Union as states equal to all the other states. Should slavery be 
permitted to plant itself in those territories? 
There, Lincoln and his party had drawn the line: they would not crush slavery 
where i~ was, but they would not allow it to spread, either. The Southern states were 
outraged at this denial, fearful that if slavery could not grow and extend itself, it 
was doomed to a slow death. "The government claimed no right to do more than to 
restrict the territorial enlargement of it," but that was more than sufficient to make 
the slaveholding South begin thinking of cancelling its membership in the Union. 
"Both parties deprecated war," Lincoln said, "but one of them would make war rather 
than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish." 
Lincoln paused for a long moment, looking out over the upturned faces crowding 
the Capitol steps. "And the war came." 
Since Lincoln uttered those words--and they amount to no more than two 
paragraphs in an inaugural address only four paragraphs long-something close to 
so,ooo books and articles on the American Civil War have been published. Still, 
we would be hard-pressed to find a more concise statement of just what it was 
that caused the American Civil War. If we want to understand what plunged the 
American republic into its greatest crisis, and map out the paths and highways that 
led Americans to four years of unplanned-for and unlooked-for carnage, we can 
hardly do better than to take our bearings from the three signposts that Abraham 
Lincoln left us. 
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THE AMERICAN UNION 
Underlying everything else that pushed or pulled nineteenth-century Americans 
toward the abyss of civil war was one very plain fact about the United States of America: 
its political structure-that of a union of states-was a standing invitation to chaos. 
The origins of this situation extend far into the American past, all the way to 
the founding of the first English-speaking colonies in North America. Beginning 
in 1607 with Jamestown, Virginia, these settlements had been individually laid 
out, funded, settled, and organized, with next to nothing in the way of supervi-
sion from the English government. Right down to the outbreak of the American 
Revolution, the British North American colonies operated on different currencies, 
commissioned separate defense forces, and maintained separate agencies in London 
to represent their interests to the English Parliament. A dozen years of spectacu-
lar political bungling by Parliament provoked thirteen of those colonies to declare 
themselves independent of British rule in 1776. But even in the face of British armies 
sent to suppress their revolt, the American colonies were unwilling to cooperate with 
each other on more than a hit-or-miss basis. The Continental army that the colonies 
raised as a joint defense force to fight the British was continually starved for men 
and supplies, while the local colonial militias played politics at home. The Continen-
tal Congress that they formed to act as their parliament looked more like a steering 
committee than a government, and even then its deliberations were racked with 
dissension and bickering. Frequently on the run from the British, the Continental 
Congress had no power to levy taxes and only the slimmest public credibility. Even 
the Congress's Declaration of Independence, which was supposed to be the joint 
announcement that the colonies were now "Free and Independent States," had been 
co-opted by several over-eager colonial legislatures that bolted ahead to declare their 
own separate independence from British rule.3 
It took five years after the Declaration oflndependence for the Continental Con-
gress to persuade the new states to adopt some form of unified national government, 
and the states agreed only because they could not obtain an alliance with France 
·(which they needed for survival) without forming themselves into something that 
the French could recognize as a government. What they finally created in q8r was 
based on a flimsy document known as the Articles of Confederation. Under the 
Articles, each of the thirteen new states would receive equal representation in a new 
Confederation Congress, regardless of each state's size or population-a formula 
that amounted to allowing the states to come to the Confederation Congress as 
separate but equal powers, rather than participants in a national assembly.4 
3. Pauline Maier, Ameritan Scripture: Making tbe Dedaration of Independence (New York: Knopf, 1997), 
69-:JO. 
4. Kenneth Stampp, "Unam Aut Plures? The Concept of a Perpetual Union,~ in 1be Imperiled Union: 
Essays on tbe Batkground of tbe Civil war (New York: Oxford University Press, I98o), 21-29. 
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There could have been only one end to this. Soon enough, individual states would 
find themselves quarreling with each other while the Confederation Congress 
stood on the sidelines, wringing its hands. Then the quarrels would explode into 
civil war, and the war would so weaken the United States that some powerful 
European monarchy (perhaps the British again) would intervene and force the 
Americans under European control all over again. In the 178os almost all the rest 
of the world was still governed by kings who looked upon the kingless American 
republic as a bad example to their own restless subjects. Those kings had armies and 
navies that were too close to the American borders for comfort. Britain still occu-
pied Canada to the north, and Spain still ruled the western half of North America 
and all of Central and South America, and neither of them liked what they saw in 
the new republic. If the American states divided, the European powers might take 
the opportunity to conquer. 
So it was fear more than unity of purpose that finally drove the Americans to scrap 
the Articles of Confederation and write a new constitution in 1787. The Constitution 
equipped the national government with the power to raise its own income by impos-
ing taxes on the states, and created an executive president who had the authority and 
the means to enforce the decisions of Congress. Even so, there were ambiguities and 
compromises in the Constitution that allowed the individual states to retain a large 
measure of their jealously guarded autonomy. The most obvious example of compromise 
concerned the Congress. The Constitution divided the old Confederation Congress into 
two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives. Members of the House were 
elected directly by the voters of each state, with the population of each state determining 
how many representatives each state could elect. By contrast, the members of the Senate 
were elected by the state legislatures, and each state had two senators regardless of size, 
giving each state equal voice in the Senate, just like in the Confederation Congress. 
What this meant, in effect, was that in the House, the representatives would speak for 
the people of the United States as a whole, but in the Senate, the senators were clearly 
understood to be representing the interests of the states. 
There were other telltale problems, too. The Constitution created a confusing 
and cumbersome system for electing the national president. As it was, the Consti-
tution did not specify who was permitted to vote for the president (the eligibility 
of voters was a question left to the individual states). For those who could vote, the 
Constitution specified that they would cast their ballots not for a particular presi-
dential candidate but for a handful of state electors, who would then assemble in 
an electoral college and vote as state delegations for the next president. So it was 
not the people of the Uniteq States who elected a president, but committees of 
state electors. Ominously, the states made no pledge in the text of the Constitu-
tion to treat the arrangement as a perpetual one. Three of the state conventions 
that eventually ratified the Constitution-those of New York, Virginia, and Rhode 
Island-agreed to ratification only after adding resolutions that declared that they 
still retained the right to retrieve the powers they had surrendered "whensoever it 
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shall become necessary to their happiness."5 And some of them quickly came close 
to doing just that. In I798, the second president, John Adams, attempted to quell 
political opposition to his administration through the so-called Alien and Sedition 
Acts. In reply, two of the foremost American political thinkers, Thomas Jefferson 
(the author of the Declaration of Independence) and James Madison (the archi-
tect of the Constitution), drafted the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, which 
announced to President Adams that the individual states still reserved the privilege 
of declaring acts of the national Congress unconstitutional and non-operative. 
As late as the I83os, the United States of America looked and behaved more like 
a league or a compact of states than a single country, and its Constitution was still 
regarded as something of an experiment, embraced mosdy for its practicality. "Asking 
a State to surrender a part of her sovereignty is like asking a lady to surrender part of 
her chastity," declared the eccentric Virginia politician John Randolph of Roanoke, 
who even on the floor of Congress made his loyalties clear by insisting that "when 
_I speak of my country, I mean the Commonwealth ofVirginia."The English travel 
writer George Featherstonhaugh was confounded to hear a South Carolinian declare: 
"If you ask me if I am an American, my answer is, No, sir, I am a South Carolinian."The 
framers of the Constitution, fearing the possibility that state antagonisms, economic 
competition, and political corruption would easily derail the national system, appealed 
to the spirit of union or the virtue of political compromise to defuse the threat of 
divisiv~ issues, but did not appeal to some elusive national authority.6 
This is not to say, though, that Americans were not becoming a nation in other 
ways. No matter how jealously the states regarded and defended their individual 
political privileges and identities, it would have been hard for a people who spoke 
the same language, read the same books, heard the same music, and voted in the 
same elections not to develop some sort of fellow-feeling, irrespective of state 
boundaries. This was especially true for those Americans who had actually borne 
the brunt of the fighting in the Revolutionary War, and who carried out of the 
Revolution a highly different perspective on the unity of the American republic. In 
the snows of Valley Forge and in the heat of the Carolinas, in victory and in defeat, 
soldiers from Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and all the other states had 
undergone so many hardships together that their different backgrounds faded to 
unimportance. 
One of these soldiers,] ohn Marshall, began the Revolution as a Virginia militiaman, 
then enlisted in the Continental army, and endured the army's winter at Valley Forge. 
He remembered later, "I was confirmed in the habit of considering America as my 
5. Ralph Ketcham, 7be Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates (New York: 
Signet Classic, zoo3), zzs. 
6. Robert Dawidoff, 7be Education of john Randolph (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), 341 rs,.; Peter 
B. Knupfer, 7be Union as It Is: Constitutional Unionism and Sectional Compromise, J78;r86r (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1991), us-r7i George Featherstonhaugh, Excursion 7brough the Slave 
States, from Washington on the Potomac to the Frontier of Mexico (London: John Murray, r844), 2:341. 
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country and Congress as my government," not Virginia.7 And Marshall would later 
rise, as chief justice of the Supreme Court, to shape a system of national jurisprudence 
that transcended state boundaries and loyalties. A South Carolinian (turned Tennes-
sean) named Andrew Jackson lost two brothers and his mother to the Revolution. 
Captured by the British, he refused a British officer's order to clean the officer's boots 
and was rewarded with a blow from the officer's sword. It left a scar Jackson carried 
with him for the rest of his life, and it also left a burning hatred of all enemies of his 
country, whether they were British invaders or (as it turned out later) fellow South-
erners trying to nullify congressionallegislation.8 
By the end of the r83os, the Union, crisscrossed by "mystic chords of memory," 
had ascended to the level of a national faith. The belligerent Tennessee parson and 
newspaper editor William G. Brownlow attacked the notion that the Constitution 
was merely a temporary political umbrella put up by the individual states to protect 
their state interests. "The Constitution," insisted Brownlow, was the political crea-
tion of the American people as a single nation, and it "was formed by the people 
to govern the people, and no single individual State was called upon as a separate 
'sovereignty' to sign or ratify that Constitution." Alexander Stephens, who one day 
would serve as the vice president of the Confederate States, said that for Abraham 
Lincoln the Union "rose to the sublimity of a religious mysticism," and even a per-
fectly straightforward politician such as William H. Bissell oflllinois felt no embar-
rassment in claiming that whenever anyone in the West carelessly broached the idea 
of"destroying this Union," there would not be "a man throughout that vast region 
who will not raise his hand and swear by the Eternal God, as I do now, that it shall 
never be done, if our arms can save it." When, as it turned out, other members of 
the Union did just that and asked the Lincolns and Bissells to choose between state 
or local interests and the Union, the answer would more and more be the Union.9 
The experience of the Revolution and the development of political maturity were 
only the first steps away from disunity and suspicion. The new political generation of 
Americans in the 183os found two other important cultural paths by which to rise above 
their divisions. One of these was the embrace of a common religion. Although the 
Constitution forbade Congress from singling out any particular religion or religious 
denomination as a national "established" church, it was nevertheless clear that Americans 
in all parts of the country overwhelmingly favored Protestant, evangelical Christianity. 
The overall number of Christian congregations rose from 2,500 in r78o to 52,000 in 
7. Joseph Story, A Discourse upon the Lifo, Character; and Services of the Honorable john Marshall (Boston: 
J. Munroe, 1835), zo. 
8. Samuel Putnam Waldo, Memoirs of Andrew jackson: Major-General in the Army of the United States 
(Hartford, CT: Silas Andrus, r8r8), 30. 
9. William G. Brownlow, Sketches of the Rise, Progress, and Decline of Secession (Philadelphia: Applegate, 
r86z), zzr, Ale:omder H. Stephens, A Constitutional View of the Late U&r Bel'Ween the States (Philadelphia: 
National Publishing, 1870 ), 2:448; Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: 1he Ideology of the Republican 
Party Before the Civil U&r (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 179· 
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r86o. Along with the new congregations came new publication agencies, such as the 
American Bible Society and American Tract Society, which spun off a million Bibles 
and 6 million religious books and pamphlets each year, and a constellation of inter-
locked social reform and missionary agencies. Evangelical Protestant churches claimed 
approximately I5 percent of the American population as full members, and as much 
as 40 percent of all Americans as "attenders" or "hearers."1° There were many differ-
ences between various groups of evangelical Protestants, and they organized themselves 
into more separate and subdivided denominations-Presbyterians, Baptists, Method-
ists, Congregationalists, and so on-than there were states. But one thing they had in 
common was a commitment to the basic outlines of evangelical piety-a direct appeal 
to the person of Jesus Christ as God, the experience of conversion from unbelief or 
half belief to fervent piety, reverence for the authority of the Bible, and an ambition to 
promote the conversion of others for their own good and the good of the larger society. 
This broadly embraced Protestant evangelicalism was heightened by the control 
these denominations exercised over American higher education. Almost all of the 
seventy-eight American colleges founded by r84o were church-related, with clergy-
men serving on the boards and the faculties. Most possessed as president a prominent 
clergyman, who capped off the senior year of his students with a major course in 
moral philosophy, based on a P.andful of Protestant ethics textbooks (the runaway 
favorite being Francis Wayland's Elements cfMoral Science) that were used across the 
country. In this way, not only American religion but also the development of Ameri-
can ethics and philosophy were shaped by a common Protestant evangelicalism.U 
Just as powerful a common bond as evangelical Christianity was the political 
ideology that Americans embraced in the Revolution. However much the struc-
ture of American politics was compi;omised and frustrated by state demands and 
state loyalties, Americans in all the states agreed that the states and the federal 
government alike were to be a republic and follow a republican form of govern-
ment. Republicanism in the eighteenth century was the political fruit of the 
Enlightenment, that sea-change intellectual movement whose principal mission 
was to overthrow authority's chokehold on European intellectual life and replace 
it with what was natural, as discovered by r~ason and experiment. The Enlighten-
ment began in the r6oos when Newton and Galileo overturned the principles of 
physical science that had been based on Aristotle's writings and replaced them with 
a new mechanical physics based on observable patterns of motion. By the 17oos, 
the philosophes of the Enlightenment had extended the reach of nature, reason, and 
experiment to the realms of politics and society, and proposed to overturn any form 
10. Jon Buder, Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, I990), 270, 278; Richard J. Carwardine, Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 3-rS. 
11. Donald H. Meyer, The lmtrut:ted Conscience: The Shaping of the American National Ethic (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 197:1.), IJ; Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Tranifur-
mation of America, I8IJ-If148 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), :1.88. 
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of political organization built on such nonrational factors as monarchy or aristocracy. 
Enlightenment thought was the principal impulse behind the American Declara-
tion oflndependence in r776, and it had its gospel in the writings ofMontesquieu, 
Cesare Beccaria, James Harrington, Algernon Sidney, and above all John Locke, as 
well as in the classical examples of ancient Greece and Rome.12 
But a more practical source of republicanism in America came simply from the 
governments the Americans had been compelled to improvise in their infancy as 
British colonies. The British government had taken a hands-off (and no-investment) 
stance toward the colonies founded in its name on the North American eastern 
seaboard, allowing the tasks of creation and maintenance to be left to corporate en-
trepreneurs (such as the Virginia Company) or to religious dissidents (such as the 
Qyakers, Puritans, and Catholics) whom the British crown was only too happy to see 
disappear westward across the ocean. Not until much later did the British government 
awaken to (and begin demanding oversight of) the extraordinarily productive successes 
that three or four generations of this onetime riffraff had created for themselves in 
America. By r750, the American colonies had developed in practice what looked for 
all the world like what Locke and his coadjutors had described on paper-little self-
governing commonwealths. The Revolution was in large measure the response of the 
Americans to a British ultimatum to surrender that self-government. 
Self-government meant that political sovereignty originated in the people, who 
possessed all the competence required for governing, and who should be free from 
having to cringe before aristocrats or beg their-bread from wealthy landowners. Not 
that Americans ever felt that they needed to, since America possessed no domestic 
aristocracy to start with and, apart from the great manors of the Hudson River 
Valley and the plantations of the Virginia tidewater, no vast chateau-bred landlords. 
During the Revolution the Whigs proceeded to expel the Tory loyalists who had 
represented the wealthiest segment of the old colonial society. The new republic 
was able to begin its life with more than 90 percent of its citizens owning their own 
property and producing their own sustenance. In the Treaty of Paris the United 
States also acquired the wilderness beyond the Appalachians, where landowning 
could be thrown open to new generations; these lands would be organized as federal 
territories and eventually admitted to the Union as states.13 
Every new territory wanted to move as swiftly as possible toward statehood, and to 
do that, they had to meet requirements for minimum numbers of voters. That, in turn, 
created pressure in the West to lower the eligibility requirements for voting because the 
more voters who could be counted, the faster a territory could advance to the privileges 
of statehood. For that reason, the United States would be a republic, but it ':l'ould be 
U. Bernard Bailyn, 7be Itleological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press,r967), 45· 
13. Edward J. Renehan, '1be Treaty of Paris: '1be Precursor to a New Nation (New York: Chelsea House, 
zoo9), 84-ss. 
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driven to become a more and more democratic republic. Republics, after all, are simply 
governments that dispense with kings and aristocrats; the definition of who can be a 
citizen is what makes a republic more or less democratic. The classical republics of the 
ancient world were actually very narrow in their definitions of who could be a citizen. 
The American republic, by contrast, started off on a much more democratic footing 
than almost any other republic in history, and in its first half century of existence 
it became increasingly more so, to the point where Americans would use the terms 
democracy, republic, republican, and democratic almost as synonyms. 
A common religion and a highly democratic republicanism were cultural tools 
that helped Americans transcend narrow state loyalties. But there were also forces at 
work that were just as likely to push in the other direction and increase rather than 
diminish the instability of the American union. 
The most serious of these forces was economic. Enlightenment philosophes strug-
gled to bring economics as much into conformity to the rule of nature and reason 
as physics and politics were, and the chief among these economists was the Scot 
Adam Smith. In An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (pub-
lished, in a significant coincidence, in the same year as the American Declaration 
of Independence), Smith cast down the restraints on commerce and trade imposed 
by contemptuous aristocrats all across Europe in favor of allowing the instinctive 
human passion for competitiveness a free hand in determining economic outcomes. 
"Every individual,"wrote Smith, "intends only his own security; and ... intends only 
his own gain, and he is in this ... led by an invisible hand to promote an end which 
was no part of his intention," in just the same way that Newton's apple obeyed a law 
of gravity. Just as it would be absurd to ask governments to intervene in the laws of 
physics, it should be considered just·as absurd for governments to intervene in the 
laws of the markets. "The obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes 
itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of jus-
tice, is left perfectly; free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both 
his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of 
men."The irony of this, however, is that "by pursuing his own interest he frequently 
promotes that of the society more effectually .... "14 
Speaking of Adam Smith and The Wealth of Nations means that it is also nec-
essary to speak about capitalism, if only because capitalism has become syn-
onymous with Smith's description of a "natural liberty" in economics. Actually, 
capitalism represents at least four different ways of organizing a nation's pro-
duction and consumption of goods. Capitalism can be understood as shorthand 
for the pursuit of profits from the sale of goods or services, and in that sense, 
capitalism has been around since the dawn of history itself-hence Smith's claim 
14. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes !if the Wealth !if Nations, ed. C.J. Bullock (New York: 
P. F. Collier, 1909 [1776 ]), 351, 466. 
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that it was "obvious and simple." Capitalism might also be regarded as a system 
of economic organization where governments, eager to promote the prosperity 
of their nations, open a "level playing field" and do no more than wish that the 
best economic man win. However, it still remains government's task to define the 
rules and police the boundaries of the playing field, since the great temptation 
of every competitor is to bribe the referees and kill the competition, literally or 
otherwise. Capitalists, in that respect, were the last people whom government 
should wish to entrust with the keys to the playing field's maintenance locker, 
and Smith was certainly no exponent of removing government's referee role. In 
the most complicated sense of the word, capitalism refers to a system by which 
the owners of productive mechanisms-whether the "mechanism" is a farm or a 
factory-employ laborers to whom they pay wages. The wages are never equivalent 
to the value the laborers put into the goods and services they produce. Because they 
do not own these mechanisms, laborers have no say in what price the real owners 
obtain for those goods and services. Hence, the owners sell the goods and services 
but only pay the producers a wage; the difference between the selling price and the 
wages (the "surplus value") becomes the owners' capital and is plowed back into the 
farm or factory to hire more wage laborers and produce more goods. This version-
which is how Karl Marx defined capitalism-is also the most negative, as though 
capitalism were little more than systematic theft of the real value that exploited 
laborers imparted to goods. On the other hand, at its simplest the term capitalism 
can be used to describe any system in which an attitude of entrepreneurship and 
self-improvement is the key. 
Monarchies were never friendly to capitalism, any more than they were to re-
publicanism. They preferred stability in their nations' economic as well as politi-
callives, and the more rigid the structure of a nation's monarchy, the less favor 
with which it was likely to look upon th~ brash self-promotion of shopkeepers, 
shoemakers, and town burgesses (burgess bei"ng the term fr~m which bourgeoisie 
developed to describe the class of people most friendly to capitalism). But this 
self-promotion, based on cleverness, talent, and a strict eye to the main chance 
rather than noble birth, is also why the Enlightenment, which was in the business 
of overthrowing irrational appeals to mere authority, found in capitalist entrepre-
neurs and an independent-minded bourgeoisie its favorite heroes. "I don't know 
which is the more useful to the state," Voltaire (the pen name of the French satirist 
Fran~j:ois-Marie Arouet) speculated wickedly, "a well-powdered lord who knows 
precisely what time the king gets up in the morning and what time he goes to bed, 
and who gives himself airs of grandeur while playing the role of slave in a minis-
ter's antechamber, or a great merchant who enriches his country, sends orders from 
his office to Surat and to Cairo, and contributes to the well-being of the world." 
Joseph Addison was "wonderfully delighted" to see "the grand scene of business" 
among London's merchants, "thriving in their own private fortunes, and at the 
same time promoting the public stock ... by bringing into the country whatever 
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is wanting, and carrying out of it whatever is superfluous."15 1he Enlightenment's 
ideal social order would thus be a mix of mildly democratic republicanism in the 
political realm and a free-market regime in the economic realm, a combination 
that became known through the early decades of the nineteenth century simply 
as liberalism. 
France liked to think of itself as the intellectual home of the Enlightenment, but 
(ironically, for American observers) enlightened French thinkers looked to Britain 
as their favorite model of a liberal society because there the monarchy's reach was 
at its weakest in all of Europe, and its shopkeepers and entrepreneurs were at their 
most vigorous and unrestrained. "Commerce," added Voltaire, "which has brought 
wealth to the citizenry of England, has helped to make them free, and freedom has 
developed commerce in its turn. "16 British capitalists were also the most scientific, 
for it was the British who invented the technology (beginning with the steam en-
gine) that turned the small-scale production of handmade goods and harvest-time 
services into industrial manufacturing. 
To supply the labor for steam-powered production, the British economy moved 
large segments ofits population out of agriculture and into factory production. Since 
the factory worker did nothing but work in the factory, British capitalists needed new 
sources for feeding and clothing that new workforce, and they found those sources in 
American agriculture. Only a few Americans were prepared for this. Before I8oo in 
the United States, only farmers in the hinterlands of the major ports, such as Phila-
delphia, Charleston, and Chesapeake Bay, were seriously committed to raising crops 
to sell for cash on foreign markets, if only because for others the costs of getting those 
products to markets for sale was greater than any profit that could be reaped from 
the selling. An ordinary stagecoach ride from Boston to New York cost between SIO 
and $II in 182o-two weeks' wages-and that said nothing about the cost of shipping 
produce or driving cattle to market; five weeks were needed to move that stagecoach 
from Nashville to Washington. Most American farmers were still organized around 
a household economy that sold little except small surpluses off the farm and which 
relied on barter and extended loans for the few manufactured goods it needed.17 
But by the I83os, the allurements of selling agricultural produce to British and 
foreign markets had become too great to resist, largely because access to those markets 
had become too easy to ignore. The steam engine, which had made large-scale manu-
facturing possible among England's "dark, satanic mills," produced an unlooked-for 
by-product when inventors such as John Fitch and Robert Fulton bolted steam 
15. Voltaire, Philosophical Letters: Letters Concerning the English Nation, ed. Ernest Dilworth (Indianapolis, 
IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961 [!734]), 4o; Addison, "The Spectator No. LXIX" (May 19, 17n), in The Spectator in 
Eight Volumes (Philadelphia: Samuel Bradford, x8oJ), 1:316. 
16. Voltaire, Philosophical Letters, 39· 
17. Paul A. Gllje, "The Rise of Capitalism in the Early Republic," in Wages of Independence: Capitalism in 
the Early American Repuhlic, ed. Paul A. Gilje (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, zoo6), u. 
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engines onto riverboats to push them up and down rivers; and then bolted steam en-
gines onto platforms that rolled on iron tram rails. The steamboats and the railroads 
became the chief force in driving down the costs of access to markets, and slowly, 
American farmers moved away from multicrop farming and livestock raising for their 
own subsistence and toward single-crop agriculture, where their produce could be 
sold for cash, and the cash used to buy manufactured clothing or tools made in other 
people's factories.18 
It was at this point that the hinge between democratic republicanism and liberal 
capitalism began to squeak. Republicanism was based upon liberty, and liberty was 
based upon independence, but who could consider American farmers independent 
if their well-being now hung on the price their crops or meat or poultry might get 
on a faraway exchange market? And how independent could a shoemaker be when 
he was forced to close up his shop because cheaply manufactured British shoes cost 
less than his handmade ones, and take a wage-based job in a factory or mill built on 
the British model? On the other hand, how independent would America remain if 
it stuck its economic head in the sand, persisted in the old patterns of household ag-
riculture, and became a relative weakling among the emerging capitalist economies 
of Europe? 
These questions were posed, in the name of protecting the Republic, by repub-
licans who now found themselves differing seriously from one another. Beginning 
with Alexander Hamilton and the Federalist Party, liberal republicans argued that 
American independence depended on the strength and competitiveness of its 
economy on the world capitalist markets. Hamilton, in particular, favored direct 
federal government intervention in the American economy to encourage manufac-
turing development, trade (through publicly financed roads, bridges, and canals), and 
finance (by chartering a national bank, which could lend money to entrepreneurs). 
Power, if used judiciously, could actually protect and promote liberty. Classical 
republicans, championed by Thomas Jefferson and represented in the Democratic 
Party, argued that the Constitution gave the federal government no such powers 
of economic intervention. Even if it did, encouraging Americans to join the system 
of world markets would only mortgage the American republic to foreign interests 
and encourage Americans to thirst for money and power over their fellow citizens. 
Classical republicans wrapped themselves in the toga of the Roman republic and 
reminded modern Americans that in ancient Rome, materialism anp self-interest on 
Adam Smith's scale were unknown: 
Then none was for a party; 
Then all were for the state; 
Then the great man helped the poor, 
18. Charles G. Sellers, 1he Market Revolution: jacksonian America, r8rs-rlJ46 (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1991), 8-23, 27-28. 
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And the poor man loved the great: 
Then lands were fairly portioned; 
Then spoils were fairly sold: 
The Romans were like brothers 
In the brave days of old.19 
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Jeffersonian Democrats especially opposed calls for government-financed public 
works, or "internal improvements," since it was obvious that the new roads, bridges, 
and canals could serve only one purpose-to make it easier for farmers to reach 
distant markets, and for the markets to tempt American farmers into their grasp. 
It also went without saying that "internal improvements" could be financed only 
through federal taxation, and farmers who grew or manufactured only for their own 
households would never be able to find the money to pay those taxes without surren-
dering their cherished independence and growing what the market would pay them 
for in cash. Power was toxic, and no amount of it was safe for liberty. "The market 
is a canker," warned a contributor to the New England Farmer in r8z9, "that will, by 
degrees, eat you out, while you are eating upon it."20 
The Democrats reserved their greatest venom for the two newest instruments of 
capitalist finance, the bank and the chartered corporation. America had known no 
banks until the very end of the American Revolution and had only eighty banks by 
r8ro. By r84o, however, there were nearly a thousand of them, including a congres-
sionally chartered "monster" Bank of the United States in Philadelphia, organized in 
r8r6 with an initial capitalization of $35 million. Democrats hated the banks because 
the banks were the chief processing agents of the markets: they extended credit for 
investment (which Democrats attacked as "phony" wealth) and either made wind-
fall profits from manufacturers and farmers when those investments succeeded or 
else seized the property of those whose enterprises failed. Liberty and virtue dwelt 
in the hearts of independent farmers sitting under their own vines and fig trees, 
unmolested by tax agents and bill collectors. "Corruption or morals in the mass of 
cultivators," Jefferson wrote in his celebrated Notes on the State of Virginia, "is a phe-
nomenon which no age nor nation has furnished an example." No one seemed to 
personifY that ideal more than Jefferson's fellow Virginian and virtuous senator, John 
Taylor of Caroline, who impressed a colleague as "plain and solid, a wise counsellor, a 
ready and vigorous debater, acute and comprehensive, ripe in all historical and politi-
cal knowledg<;, innately republican-modest, courteous, benevolent, hospitable-a 
skilful, practical farmer, giving his time to his farm and his books, when not called by 
19. Thomas Babington Macaulay, "Horatius," in Lays of Ancient Rome (London: Longman, Brown, Green 
and Longmans, 1844), 6o. 
20. Christopher Clark, 7he Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, r78o-r86o {Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 1990 ), 154. 
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an emergency to the public service-and returning to his books and his farm when 
the emergency was over."21 
Banks, on the other hand, looked like precisely the enormous concentrations of 
power and self-interest that were the source of corruption, and those fears of corrup-
tion were not eased when large-scale banks such as the Bank of the United States 
began paying handsome retainers to members of Congress to sit on its board of 
directors. Democrats were equally fearful of chartered corporations, since large-scale 
corporations could just as easily acquire the same enormous wealth as banks and, 
with it, the same power for corrupting state and local legislatures. It was a point of 
pride to John Randolph of Roanoke, one of the sharpest-tongued Jeffersonians in 
the House of Representatives, that "I am the holder of no stock whatever, except 
livestock, and had determined never to own any ... because it is the creation of a 
great privileged order of the most hateful kind to my feelings, and because I would 
rather be the master than the slave. Ifi must have a master let him be one with ep-
aulettes, something that I could fear and respect, something I could look up to-but 
not a master with a quill behind his ear."22 
For the first three decades of the American republic, it was clearly the fears of the 
Democrats that had the upper hand. Of the 4 million people living in the United 
States in 1790, 3·7 million of them lived in the countryside and only about zoo,ooo 
in towns or ports larger than z,soo people. Although the first two presidents, Wash-
ington and Adams, favored development and competition on the world markets as 
the best methoa for toughening the independence of the American economy, the 
costs of that encouragement were federal taxes. A country that had formed in a revolt 
against British taxes was in no mood to pay them to the federal government. Thomas 
Jefferson, promising an "empire for liberty,"was swept into the presidency in r8oo in a 
tremendous landslide, which secured Democratic control of the federal government 
for the next quarter century. Accordingly, the Democrats allowed banks and corpo-
rate charters to wither, and in r8o7 Jefferson briefly imposed an absolute embargo on 
all foreign trade. If the surrounding economic world required that Americans dabble 
in economic power in order to safeguard political liberty, then better to quarantine 
the Republic economically rather than surrender it to world markets.23 
What Jefferson had not entirely counted upon was the degree to which isolation 
really did translate into weakness. Britain, then at the height of its titanic grapple 
with Napoleon Bonaparte, discovered that an American government without a bank 
for borrowing or taxes for spending had no way to fund a navy for protection, and 
21. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (London: John Stockdale, 1787), 274; Thomas Hart 
Benton, 7hirty Years' View; or, A History of the Working of the American Government, from r82o to r8so (New 
York: D. Appleton, r854), 1:45· 
22. Hugh A. Garland, 7he Lift of fohn Randolph of Roanoke (New York: D. Appleton, rSso), 2:83. 
23. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, r789-r8rs (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), Jrs-r6, 376. 
18 FATEFUl LIGHTNING 
so British warships shamelessly boarded American ships and impressed American 
sailors to fill up depleted British crews. In r8I2, Jefferson's handpicked successor as 
president,] ames Madison, responded by leading the country into war against the Brit-
ish. It was a catastrophe. "Our commerce [had been] put in fetters by non-importation 
acts and embargoes; and the crisis that succeeded found us without the most ordinary 
resources of an independent people," complained John Pendleton Kennedy, a Whig 
congressman from Maryland. "Our armies went to the frontier clothed in the fabrics 
of the enemy; our munitions of war was gathered as chance supplied them from the 
four quarters of the earth; and the whole struggle was marked by the prodigality, waste 
and privation of a thriftless nation, taken at unawares and challenged to a contest 
without the necessary armor of a combatant."24 The unprepared American armies 
were routed by a British empire that was already fighting with one arm tied behind 
its back by Napoleon, and the household-based American economy fell apart. By the 
end of the war, only major loans from private bankers kept the United States Treasury 
from collapse. And only British exhaustion from its European wars kept Britain from 
turning the American republic back into British colonies.25 
The disaster of the War of r8r2 frightened many republicans away from Jefferson's 
fond dream of a nation of liberty-loving but economically powerless farmers. "These 
disasters opened our eyes to some important facts," Kennedy recalled in r8Jr. "They 
demonstrated to us the necessity of extending more efficient protection, at least, to 
those manufactures which were essential to the defence of the nation" as well as the 
establishment of"the value of a national currency, and the duty of protecting it from 
the influence of foreign disturbance" through the shield of a national banking system. 
Led by Henry Clay of Kentucky, a new party of National Republicans, or Whigs (as 
Clay renamed them in the r8Jos), resurrected the program of government support 
for internal improvements, government-sponsored banking, and a new program of 
protective tariffs to keep out cheap imported British manufactured goods and stimu-
late manufacturing' at home. "National independence was only to be maintained 
by national resistance against foreign encroachments," declared Clay in r8r6, "by 
cherishing the interest of the people, and giving to the whole physical power of the 
country an interest in tl:ie preservation of the nation." Clay went on to endorse the 
new military program, "a chain of turnpikes, roads and canals from Passamaquoddy 
to New Orleans," and tariffs to "effectually protect our manufacturers. "26 
Although the presidency remained firmly in the hands of the Democrats {except 
for a brief interlude under John Quincy Adams from 1824 to r8z8), Clay's influence 
in Congress pushed large elements of this "American System" into being anyway. 
24. John Pendleton Kennedy, "Address of the Friends ofDomestic Industry" (October z6, I8Jr), in Politi-
cal and Official Papers (New York: Putnam, rSp), n~o, I22-zJ. 
25. Alan Taylor, 1he Civil War of r8n: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels (New York: Knopf, 
zoro), 46. 
26. Robert V. Remini, Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), IJ6-:37· 
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It was not until the election of Andrew Jackson, an unreconstructed Jeffersonian 
radical, as president in r828 that the Democrats struck back. Jackson vetoed congres-
sional appropriations for public roads, effectively destroyed the Bank of the United 
States by refusing to deposit federal money there, and·paid off the national debt so 
that there would no need for federal taxes and (above all) no need for federal tariffs 
to protect American industries and corporations.27 
Jackson's war against liberal market-based power was, in the long run, far from 
successful. Clay, in the role of Jackson's nemesis, remained a powerful figure in · 
American politics, and many banks protected themselves from Jackson's wrath by 
obtaining charters from cooperative state legislatures. Still, that lack of success cannot 
obscure the anger and violence with which Whigs and Democrats-both supposedly 
dedicated to republicanism-had come to regard each other. By the 184os, the Whigs 
had defined themselves as the party of liberal democracy, of an upwardly mobile mid-
dle class, willing to embrace the fluidity of the market and eager to promote national 
unity and government support for railroad construction, canals, and even steamship 
lines. They spoke for the small-scale manufacturer who worked beside his employees 
in making boots and shoes, forging iron, tanning leather; for the banker who lent him 
the money. to start up his business and the lawyer who collected his debts; and for the 
commercial farmer who grew crops for cash sale on distant markets. In an economy 
where the average number of employees per manufacturing establishment was only 
fourteen, it was not unreasonable for the Whigs to see themselves as the friends of 
"the enterprising mechanic, who raises himself by his ingenious labors from the dust 
and turmoil ofhis workshop, to an abode of ease and elegance; the industrious trades-
man, whose patient frugality enables him at last to accumulate enough to forego the 
duties of the counter and indulge a well-earned leisure." Perhaps most important, the 
Whigs had enlisted the support of a vast majority of Protestant evangelicals, and they 
wedded their economic gospel of hard work and thrift to the evangelical gospel of 
moral self-control.281hey were the party of the bourgeoisie, the "middling sort," who 
bridled at slavery and aristocracy in equal portions, and who wanted nothing but the 
liberty to "improve" themselves without molestation. 
The Democrats remained dedicated to resisting "consolidated" national govern-
ment with its tariffs and "improvements." They appealed most strongly to the old 
elite families of the Republic, who feared and resented the ambitious rise of Whig 
entrepreneurs, and to the poorest farmers and urban workers, who suspected that the 
Whigs were merely the agents of a "money power" out to rob them, through taxes or 
Zl. Harry Watson, Liberty and Power: 1he Politics offacksonianAmerica ({New York: Hill and Wang, 1990 ), 
132-55· 
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through financial chicanery, of the little they had. "An organized, concentrated, and 
privileged money power is one of deadly hostility to liberty," warned a Democratic 
convention in Ohio in 1845· That included "any form or reform of banking" and any 
encouragement to manufacturing. "Manufactures are not of themselves objects of 
desire to a free people, or of favor for a free government," since they "involve the ne-
cessity of a crowded population, subject to a very arbitrary control over their comfort 
by a few wealthy persons, and devoted to unwholesome employment." Both parties 
spoke the language of democratic republicanism, but both were also convinced that 
their brand of democratic republicanism was the best guarantee of liberty. As one 
historian has summed up, the Whigs were the party of America's hopes, the Demo-
crats the party of its fears.29 
The great danger posed by these arguments over power, liberalism, and republics 
was the possibility that they might find an outlet in the ramshackle structure of 
the federal Union. During the War of I8I2, New Englanders were hard hit by the 
naval blockade that British warships imposed on them, and the more they suffered 
from this blockade, the more the suffering seemed to be the fault .of people from 
other parts of the country, such as President Madison (a Virginian), whose section 
presumably had something to gain from the war that New England did not. In 
December 1814 delegates from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island met 
at Hartford, Connecticut, to express their opposition to the war and make ugly sug-
gestions about seceding from the Union and making a separate peace with Great 
Britain. The delegations' threats all blew over because the war ended a month later, 
but the event was a dangerous indication that states or sections of the country who 
suspected that their liberties were being leeched by someone else's thirst for power 
might take advantage of the autonomy provided them by the federal Union, and 
leave the Union for good. 
A more dramatic example of the intersection of ideology and self-interest oc-
curred in 1832 over the federal tariff. For more than a decade, South Carolina and 
the other Southern states had been vigorously protesting the use of tariffs to protect 
American industry. Tariffs such as the one imposed in r816 boosted the price of 
imported manufactured goods by 25 percent over their original valuation, and forced 
consumers to buy American-made goods, which were considerably more costly than 
the imports had originally been. South Carolina's John Caldwell Calhoun observed 
that this was fine for New England, which was home to many of America's in-
fant industries, but it was very hard on South Carolina, which specialized in cotton 
29. "Letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, on the Effect of the Tariff of x842, on the Agricultural and 
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growing and needed to buy manufactured goods from elsewhere. Congress was not 
inclined to give the South Carolinians relief, and in 1828, Congress passed a tariff so 
stiff (it imposed import duties up to so percent on the value of some imports) that 
South Carolina dubbed it "the Tariff of Abominations." 
Calhoun saw the tariff not just as an economic issue but also as a challenge by 
the federal government to South Carolina's liberty as a state. For two years, while he 
was serving as Andrew Jackson's vice president, Calhoun fought the tariff through 
his political lieutenants in Congress, insisting that South Carolina had the authority 
to nullifJ any federal law it deemed unsatisfactory (including tariffs) unless three-
quarters of the other states had the opportunity to review the law and approve it. Early 
in I8Jo, Robert Hayne of South Carolina, acting as Calhoun's mouthpiece, delivered 
a long and powerful polemic on the floor of the Senate, defending the state sover-
eignty of South Carolina against a "consolidated" Union. Hayne was argued down by 
Massachusetts senator Daniel Webster, who proclaimed {in words that subsequent 
generations of American schoolchildren were required to memorize) that the federal 
government was "the people's constitution; the people's government" and the power of 
the Union should not be splintered by one state under the specious plea of liberty. "Lib-
erty and Union, "Webster concluded, must be "now and forever, one and inseparable. "'Jo 
Undeterred by Webster's eloquence, Calhoun hoped to play on the anti-tariff 
sympathies of President Jackson, calculating that Jackson would not use force to 
impose a tariff he did not welcome, and certainly not in the state in which he had 
been born. Jackson was invited by Calhoun and his friends to a Jefferson's birthday 
dinner on April 13, I8JO, in the hope that Calhoun might prod an anti-tariff state-
ment out of Jackson. After dinner, the toasts went round the table, beginning with 
Calhoun and building one by one to a carefully orchestrated anthem of praise for 
state sovereignty. But when Jackson rose to present his toast, he stared point-blank 
at Calhoun and proposed, "Our Federal Union: it must be preserved!" then held his 
glass aloft as a sign that the toast was to be drunk standing. Calhoun and the others 
struggled weakly to their feet, Calhoun spilling a trickle of wine as he trembled in 
shock. "The Union," Calhoun gasped in response, "next to our liberty the most dear.''31 
Calhoun had gready misjudged Jackson's loyalty to the Union. Realizing that 
he had lost all hope of influencing Jackson, he resigned his vice presidency and 
returned to South Carolina. On November 24, I8J2, the Calhounites led a specially 
called convention in South Carolina to nullifY the collection of the tariff within 
South Carolina, threatening secession from the Union if the federal government 
interfered. Jackson replied on December 10, 1832, with a proclamation announcing 
30. "Speech of Mr. Webster, of Massachusetts," January 26 and 27, r83o, in 1be Webster-Hayne Debate on 
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that nullification was "incompatible with the existence of the Union .... The Con-
stitution forms a government, not a league." On that note, nullification was dealt a 
staggering blow, and Jackson went on to take a further swipe at secession by add-
ing, "To say that any state may at pleasure secede from the Union is to say that the 
United States is not a nation." 
Jackson had no more love than Calhoun for banks, tariffs, and federally funded 
"improvements" projects, but he was also the president of the United States, and he 
was not used to challenges from what he called a "coward, hypocrite, conspirator, 
traitor and fool" such as Calhoun. Jackson obtained from Congress a Force Bill, 
which authorized him to use the army and navy to suppress South Carolina resist-
ance. Before force became necessary, however, the more conciliatory Henry Clay had 
produced a compromise measure that provided for the graduated reduction of the 
tariff. On March rs, 1833, Calhoun and the South Carolinians rescinded their nul-
lification ordinance.32 
They did not, however, renounce the principle of secession. That meant that what-
ever else Americans might hold in common, their political structure-a Union of 
sometimes grudging and suspicious states-remained vulnerable in any crisis in 
which any state with a grievance might try to end its cooperation with the others 
and stalk out of the Union. "Altho I am for the Union & no Nullifier," wrote one 
uneasy Virginian in January 1833, "yet my southern feelings & prejudice are so strong, 
that I know I should hate to see a Southern man vanquished by a northern one .... "33 
Jackson might have pre.vented disunion over the tariff, and Clay might have dem-
onstrated how compromise was the best method for disarming confrontation, but as 
far as Calhoun was concerned, that did not mean that the remedy of secession would 
not be available for future use if a more demanding set of circumstances called for 
it. And, as many Americans could already see, such a set of circumstances was very 
likely to appear in the form of the issue of slavery, as it was practiced in the Southern 
states. No one less than Andrew Jackson had already glumly predicted, after the 
nullification crisis had passed, that "the nullifiers in the South intend to blow up a 
storm on the slave question .... "Nullification might be defeated, he told his aide 
John Coffee, but "they will try to arouse the Southern people on this false tale. This 
ought to be met, for be assured these men will do any act to destroy the union, & 
form a southern Confederacy, bounded north, by the Potomac river.'134 
But even with all the forces that appeared to be pulling Americans apart-from 
the fissiparous nature of the federal Union to the clashing economic visions ofWhig 
and Democrat-none of them had the weight to outbalance the forces making the 
32. James Parton, Life of Andrew jackson (New York: Mason Bros., r86o), 3:447,460,468, 474· 
33. Richard E. Ellis, 1he Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States Rights, and the Nullification Crisis 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), I9I· 
34. Robert V. Remini,Andrewjackson and the Course if American Demor:racy, I8,JJ-I&/5 (New York: Harper 
and Row, r984), 42· 
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American Union stronger with every decade, nor did they have the power by them-
selves to fracture the Union. That sort of disruption would require the introduction 
of a cat~yst, which would act on all the divisions of Americans to worsen them. 
That catalyst would be slavery. 
SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUfH 
Jefferson Davis did not like Yankees. 
Born in Kentucky and raised in Mississippi, Davis found it something of a nov-
elty to meet Northerners when he arrived at the United States Military Academy at 
West Point as a cadet in r824. But it was not a novelty he enjoyed. He found Yankees 
tight-fisted, chilly, and unsociable. "The Yankee part of the corps [of cadets] ... are 
not ... such associates as I would at present select." Northerners were dedicated 
to making money, pinching pennies, and building factories; they were all "vulgar 
parvenus ... vulgar landlords, capitalists, and employers." Henry Rootes Jackson, a 
Georgian who, like Davis, had gone north for his collegiate education, experienced 
the same revulsion. "Yankees, and Yankee gold" brought in their penny-pinching 
wake everything "impure, inhuman, uncharitable, unchristian and uncivilized." A 
Virginian on tour in New England in r834 was reminde~ that "Yankee tricks, and 
Yankee knavery, are ideas inseparable from the word Yankee." Southerners were an-
other quantity altogether. Southerners preferred the relaxed pace of agricultural life 
close to the rhythms of nature; they were aristocratic, noble-minded, genen:ms, tradi-
tional. In fact, Southerners even looked different from Northerners. "Foreigners have 
all remarked on the care-worn, thoughtful, unhappy countenances of our people," 
George Fitzhugh, a Virginian, wrote in r854, but that description "only applies to 
the North, for travellers see little of us at the South, who live far from highways and 
cities, in contentment on our farms." By r86r, claimed Albert Pike, it had become 
manifest that "the people of the South and those of the North are essentially two 
races of men, with habits of thought and action very unalike. "35 
Fitzhugh and Pike were at least partly right. Mter the Revolution, European tour-
ists and journalists flocked to America to gawk at the operation of the new republic, 
and they did agree that the Southern states of the American democracy seemed like 
a country unto itself, although the watchers did not always mean that observation 
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to be a compliment. The statistics the travelers amassed, or culled from the United 
States census reports, put a decidedly different spin on Fitzhugh's praise of Southern 
agriculture. In r85o, the South possessed only one-quarter of the railroad mileage of 
the Republic, and less than one-fifth of the country's manufacturing capacity. Three 
times as many Northerners lived in cities, while value of northern farmland was 
reckoned, acre for acre, at more than twice that in the South. In the North, less than 
5 percent of the population was illiterate; in the South, illiteracy ran as high as 40 
percent in some areas. For "the first time in the States," wrote English correspondent 
William Howard Russell as his train crossed through into North Carolina in r86r, 
"I noticed barefooted people" and "poor broken-down shanties or loghuts" filled with 
"paleface ... tawdry and ragged" women and "yellow, seedy-looking" men.36 
And yet the impressions of difference that foreign travelers gained from their tours 
of the South were also likely to miss many of the subtleties of Southern money and 
manners. The political and social economy of the Southern states was an exceedingly 
complex affair, compounded by deceptively stable appearances and highly aggressive 
commercial enterprise. It was a rash traveler indeed who rushed in to announce that 
the enigma of the South was now solved. 
The first appearance that shaped the initial impressions of onlookers was the 
dominance of cotton agriculture in the South. Single-crop agriculture was actually a 
habit with a long history in the Southern states, stretching back into colonial times 
when the South's prosperity had relied almost entirely on tobacco grown around 
Chesapeake Bay and rice or indigo in the South Carolina lowlands. The soils of the 
South faded filst, though. Lands farmed for five years had to be left fallow for five 
or even ten years to regain their fertility. By the time of the Revolution, tobacco and 
indigo production had gone into decline, and the South faced an agricultural crisis 
of alarming proportions. Then, in 1793, a New England-born inventor, Eli Whitney, 
constructed a simple device known as the cotton gin, which was able to take raw 
cotton, separate the fiber of the cotton from the seeds, and produce a usable product 
with no more than the effort needed to turn a handle. At one stroke, cotton produc-
tion became mechanically simple and economically viable. 
At virtually the same moment that Whitney's gin simplified the production 
process, Great Britain's factory-based textile industry began its clamor for new, cheap 
sources of cotton. Demand met supply, and between the 1790s and r85o, British 
cotton imports from the South leapt from 12 million pounds a year to 588 million 
pounds; in the same period, British exports of finished cotton products rocketed 
from 40 million square yards to 2 billion square yards, while the costs of cotton goods 
fell by 1850 to I percent of what they had been in the 178os. Cotton brought Britain 
power and prosperity, employing 1.5 million workers in the textile factories alone. 
Cotton, in return, brought the South economic and political power in the American 
republic. By r86o, Southern cotton constituted 57 percent of all American exports; 
36. W. H. Russell, My Diary Nurth and South, ed. Fletcher Pratt (New York: Harper, I954), sz. 
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compared to No.cthern grain farms, which exported only 5 percent of their total crop, 
Southern cotton plantations shipped 75 percent of their cotton abroad.37 
But cotton brought the South bane as well as blessing. The rage for cotton prof-
its meant that the South was forever having to import manufactured goods, either 
from the North or else from abroad over the intolerable hurdle of federal tariffs. To 
buy these goods, Southern planters were compelled to mortgage their next crop to 
Northern manufacturers and bankers in order to buy the cotton gins and other tools 
they needed to plant and harvest the crop in the first place. The money that flowed 
from English cotton buyers back to the South generally came in the form of bills 
and drafts that were then forwarded to New York banks to pay Southerners' bills to 
Northern merchants. This created cycles of debt for cotton growers, especially in the 
oldest parts of the South, and most of the debt was owed to northern bankers. "We 
have been good milk cows," South Carolinian Mary Boykin Chesnut complained in 
1S6z, "milked by the tariff, or skimmed ... Cotton pays everyone who handles it, sells 
it, mapufactures it, &c &c-rarely pays the men who make it."38 The faster planters 
in the old cotton states ran to produce more cotton, the faster they piled up debts 
for the ~osts of production. By 1S5o, some of them were surviving on profit margins 
as low as 2 or 3 percent. 
As a result, some Southerners came to resent the burden that the cotton system 
placed upon them. As early as ISIS, John Taylor of Caroline warned that in the 
upper South, cotton was accelerating soil exhaustion: "The fertility of our country 
has been long declining, and ... our agriculture is in a miserable state," and only 
a vigorous and intelligent program of manuring, drainage, and crop rotation could 
save it. Thirty years later, the Virginia planter and amateur agricultural scientist 
Edmund Ruffin pleaded for more intelligent use of fertilizers and crop rotation, 
and called for state aid to agricultural societies. Governor James Henry Hammond 
of South Carolina plowed up strips of ground beside public roads and advertised 
the use of new fertilizers on them so that passersby could have an example to follow 
with their own lands. In 1849, Hammond harangued the South Carolina State 
Agricultural Society on how "a combined system of Agriculture, Manufactures, and 
Commerce, are essential in promoting the prosperity and happiness of a commu-
nity." And in 1S5z, Southerners reorganized the Southern Commercial Convention 
so that the convention could become an agency for promoting railroads, steamship 
lines, port facilities, banks, factories, and other market enterprises. Unfortunate~y, 
few of these proposals seemed to produce results. J. B. D. DeBow, the publisher of 
the Southern commercial magazine DeBow's Review, was chagrined to discover 
that Northern purchasers of his Industrial Resources of the Southern and western 
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States (1853) outnumbered Southern ones six to one; he was even more chagrined 
by the fact that two-thirds of his meager 825 Review subscribers were in arrears for 
their subscriptions.39 
In their effort to understand why Southerners would set aside the opportunity 
to diversifY their economy, journalists and travelers could only guess that South-
erners were in some peculiar way willing to exchange solid modern profits for the 
social values that came attached to traditional agriculture. They were helped to this 
conclusion by the unceasing Southern voices that proclaimed their preference for a 
way of living that (whether it was profitable or not) provided more graciousness of 
style, more leisure, and more sense of the past than the frantic, money-grubbing lives 
of modem Northern manufacturers and their armies of faceless wage-paid factory 
hands. Edward Pollard, the editor of the Richmond Examiner, liked to think of the 
Southern cotton planters as the last survival of a noble and knighdy virtue where 
"the affections were not entirely the product of money," a sort of American aristoc-
racy holding its own against the onslaught ofYankee capitalism.40 
They derived encouragement for this sort of thinking from new winds blowing 
out of Europe. The American republic had been the eldest child of the Enlighten-
ment; when a revolution overthrew the king of France in r789, it seemed that family 
of reason, liberalism, and republics was on the increase. But then the French Revo-
lutiQn collapsed into the Reign ofTerror, which in tum was replaced by the tyr-
anny of Bonaparte, and by r815 the rule of reason and the viability of republics had 
become seriously tarnished. A backlash against the Enlightenment emerged out of 
the shambles of post-Napoleonic Europe, which snarled at the failures of reason 
and glorified the romance of authority, especially when it was rooted in knighdy 
myth, chivalrous orders, and medieval faith. Its cultural paladins were Edmund 
Burke and Sir Walter Scott, Hector Berlioz and Georg Friedrich Hegel, Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and Victor Hugo, and its name was 
Romanticism. 41 
The political theorists of the Enlightenment-not just Locke but Montesquieu, 
Beccaria, Mandeville, Harrington, and Hume-based their politics on the pos-
session by all humanity of "certain inalienable rights," which could -be encoded in 
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written (and reasonable) constitutions. Looking out over the wreckage ofNapoleon's 
empire, observers found that this seemed like drivel. Not rights but the ineffable 
experience of nationhood was what governed politics. "Those who speak the same 
language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, 
long before any human art begins," Fichte proclaimed in 18o6; "they understand 
each other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more 
and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable 
whole."42 And Hoffman von Fallersleben sang of Germany: 
Union, right and freedom ever 
For the German fatherland! 
So with b_rotherly endeavour 
Let us strive with heart and hand! 
For a bliss that wavers never 
Union, right and freedom stand-
In this glory bloom forever, . 
Bloom, my German fatherland!43 
"There is no such thing as man in the world," the revolutionary exile Joseph de Maistre 
sneered. "During my life, I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, and so on ... but I 
must say, as for man, I have never come across him anywhere .... "It was each nation's 
collective and organic experience that made its people what they were, not some inher-
ent human qualities shared equally by everyone. Albert Taylor Bledsoe, who would 
serve in the Confederate government, agreed that civil society "is not a thing of 
compacts, bound together by promises and paper ... It is a decree of God; the spontane-
ous and irresistible working of that nature, which, in all climates, through all ages, and 
under all circumstances, manifests itself in social organizations. "44 
Southerners found Romanticism irresistibly convenient for justifying the 
plantation culture--even in the older South, where plantation agriculture faced 
bankruptcy-because the plantation embodied the mystery of Southernness. "The 
South had an element in its society-a landed gentry-which the North envied, 
and for which its substitute was a coarse ostentatious aristocracy which smelt of the 
trade," Pollard explained. He acknowledged that "the South was a vast agricultural 
country," and its "waste lands, forest and swamps" featured "no thick and intricate 
nets of internal improvements to astonish and bewilder the traveller." All the same, 
"however it [the South] might decline in the scale of gross prosperity, its people 
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